Ten Years of 9/11: Rethinking The Middle East

So by now it has been eleven years, not ten. I wrote this as a guest blog for a good friend of mine. In fact that has been my first post ever to appear on Blogger. Its message is significant enough to be stressed once again. A repost is also interesting since my next contribution, due for 09/11, will place the same Middle East policy in a long term perspective. (Damn, I said no deadlines). Enjoy!

Day to day it has been ten years since Al-Qaeda struck the United States in its heart. 9/11 was certainly one of the most dramatic events of the past two decades. I do however disagree with the common view that it was one of the most significant ones. Without wanting to palliate the cruelty of the terrorist attack, I do feel its impact on world politics is not as direct as generally accepted. The effect of 9/11 was, I argue, mostly indirect and of a subjective nature. In the course of events taking place after the towers of the World Trade Center came down, America reacted with drastic measures. Washington increased its efforts in securing the safety of its citizens, sometimes by harassing those very citizens, and started a costly war on terror. It is exactly the road taken right after the attacks that would shape world politics for the next ten years. When it comes to significance for policy makers, the heavy costs of war and often problematic progress in rebuilding ‘freed’ nations like Afghanistan outweigh the September sting.

My opinion is not that 9/11 was completely irrelevant, but I do feel its impact is one constructed in the minds of both policy makers and the public at large. The terrorist act itself was sanctified as a symbol of fundamentalist hatred towards the innocent West while it was only a minority’s brutal response to America’s actions in the Middle East. This emotional misinterpretation fed and strengthened an image of  ‘us against them’. The public opinion shifted. A vision was created in which the Middle East was believed to be full of backward terrorists plotting to bring about the end of western democracy. Of course the number of oppressing regimes we supported far surpassed Islamist states, another fact gently neglected. In turn this mistaken paradigm contributed to the American answer to the attacks: war abroad and security at home. When the American people were confronted with persisting Taliban sympathies in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan they saw their idea that the average Muslim is a warmongering fundamentalist confirmed.

Both the American answer to Muslim extremism and the distorted public opinion it partially draws upon are flawed for at least two reasons:

(1) First of all the actual causes for religious fanaticism in the Middle East are not recognized. The belief that Islam and indeed the Middle East itself is a monolith does not correspond with reality. Not  all –  not even most – Muslims agree to violence or the oppression of women. We don’t need to support militarist dictators in order to avert the rise of Islamist terrorists. An example is the young middle class that lives in Karachi, the biggest and most liberal city in Pakistan. The youth there likes to party and engage in performing arts. They proof that there exists something like a modern and self-conscious Muslim living in the Middle East. What most of us fail to see is that religious fundamentalists, such as the Taliban, gain their support by exploiting poverty. The real causes are indeed socio-economic in nature: hunger, corruption, lack of proper education, etc. Which is exactly why their support for the fundamentalists is all the bigger in underdeveloped mountainous regions.

Failing to endorse the role of socio-economic causes can have disastrous results. Take for instance the 2010 floods in Pakistan. An enlightened take on the Middle East would stress the importance of economic certainty and food supply. Because of the distorted public opinion in the West, however, the influx of financial support was substandard, worsening our credibility with a needy population. After all who wants to aid a terrorist? Another even more painful example of how counterproductive this mistake might be, has to do with the 9/11 attacks themselves: no-one dared to inquire what the motives for the attacks were. Not even the official report of the 9/11 Commission mentioned the only rational question ‘why’. Why not? Because they didn’t want to acknowledge that Al-Qaeda itself defined its terrorism as a response against US foreign policy. We don’t want people to question our policy, now do we? And so by bringing more war and destruction to the Middle East, NATO became an instrument for spreading hatred towards the West. Think of it as Newton’s third law of motion: For every action there is always an equal and opposite reaction.

(2) A second major issue is that the policy toward the Middle East has since long been dominated by a certain degree of hypocrisy. When colonization in Northern Africa and the Near East came to an end, the new nations were either ‘westernized’ or ‘Sovietized’. Experiments along the line of non-alignment were not appreciated by either Cold War camp. The resulting polarization cast its shadow over the Arab World. The US-Soviet dualism dominated conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict or the internal politics of countries like Syria or Turkey. The ground shaking Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 breached this ideological dualism and marked the rise of political Islam. Military powers in the West however remained caught in their two-party paradigm. The US in particular failed to recognize the demise of the bipolar world order and the erosion of its own status as a superpower. (As a side note I’d like to add that the Soviet regime didn’t recognize these evolutions either, but they had quite an effective eye-opener about ten years later.) Because the US government failed to look beyond the two-party structure, it trained and funded Islamists to combat the Soviets in Afghanistan. Those very same freedom fighters used their CIA training to erase numerous innocent lives on September 11, 2001.

Ever since World War II ended, the democratic West has been supporting not so democratic regimes around the globe, first to combat ‘Communism’ and now to hold off the Islamist threat. I hope my argumentation above provided insight in how seemingly isolated events are actually part of more encompassing structures. The time is right for a new paradigm in dealing with the Middle East, one that corresponds with reality. As shown in the example concerning ‘liberal’ Karachi, Islam and modernity are compatible. In the revolutions of the Arab Spring people called for social justice, free elections and an end to corruption. These protests are directed against regimes our governments supported and thus they are directed against how we treated the Middle East in the past. It is my deepest wish that news coverage of the protests in Egypt, Libya and Syria can guide the public opinion in another direction. With a public belief in the people of the Middle East our leaders might tune foreign policy accordingly, upholding fair economic relations and stressing social advancement.