Islam Spelled Backwards: A Lesson In History

The characterization of Islam as backward has a long
history. Yet such representation fails to grasp the
genesis of the backward cultural frame or the direction
of the profits generated by it. Islam is not as such
by definition, it always functions within a context .

Muslim agitation over 'insulting' imagery is nothing new. It is as present in the media as advertisement. I can't turn on my television or pick up a newspaper without bumping into the latest analysis, opinion, or tirade. Chances are that you experience the same. That is why I first decided not to contribute on this issue. Surely, the facts are by now well-known: a distasteful depiction of the Muslim prophet invoked outbreaks around the world. The violence stirred debate on the compatibility of Islam and 'modern' values like freedom of speech. All too often, the friction which exists between Islam and liberal democracy is reduced to a Clash of Civilizations. 'Islam is a backward belief incapable of allowing democracy to flourish', such is the stance. On the other side of the debate, religious extremists eagerly adhere to this logic of collision. They invert the Western insult to a threat. I dealt with this perspective before. Still, mainstream media fail to grasp the real forces at play. They either subscribe to populist name calling or conjure up an image of the 'backyard Muslim'. The latter to remind us that many Muslims are valuable members of the community. What lacks is a coherent framework to combat the superficial clash put forth.

Religion is often used - misused - as a guise for real social conflict. Indeed conflicting interests have been masked by ideological differences throughout history. Today Islam is coupled to backwardness, but during the 16th century this role was allotted to Catholicism. At the dawn of modern Europe, religious conflicts tore apart political units at most levels. The rise of Protestant movements challenged the old order. Protestantism came in many a form, from the rather modest Anglicanism to radical Dutch Remonstrants. After the dust of the Thirty Years War settled, Protestantism had triumphed in those regions that would do most well in economic terms: the Dutch Republic, England, Scotland, and to some extent France which had the Huguenot legacy. Catholicism strengthened its position in Spain, the Italian states and Poland. These more peripheral areas saw a refeudalization as opposed to the forward surge of (proto-)industry in the Protestant nations. My point? If today's rhetoric was to be applied on this historic case, the conclusion would be that Catholicism is backward while Protestantism is not. Such a view has indeed been suggested. Yet, I prefer a vision that takes into account the gameplay behind the curtain of theological discussion.

The 'Breaking of the Images' in the Low
Countries is quite comparable with Muslim
aggression toward idols. Yet one we call
progressive while the other is a sign of
anti-cultural sentiment?

Letting ideological dissent account for different social and economic realities is not a balanced view. On the other hand, one must be aware of deriving all cultural patterns from material conditions. Protestantism might more easily reach concord with progressive ideas than Catholicism, since the later has been a defining factor in a former order. But this only is a function of exactly that former constellation. It guaranteed that Protestantism could ally with socially progressive forces. Or better: that socially progressive forces could ally under the umbrella of Protestantism. New nobility, gentry, commercial entrepreneurs tried to secure their interests by assaulting Church property and the privileges of the old nobility. Another major factor was the buildup of a state machinery and the financial resources needed. The refeudalization, weaker state machineries and primacy of Catholicism in 'backward' Medieval Europe served the further rise of the 'strong states'. Baltic and Central Europe became a grain basket, producing much needed cereals of which the trade was monopolized by the Netherlands. Spain imported bullion from the New World to feed the growing economic activity in the northwest. Local aristocracies and the financial reserves of Italian city-states provided a market for Dutch and English cloth.

We have to view the position of the Islam in a similar logic. If the countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa are backward, it is not due to some primordial nature of Islam. Religion at best delivers an arsenal of symbols and values through which social and political forces act. Not so long ago the countries in those regions were ruled by an elite which promised modernity and progress. In reality people were oppressed, kept backward while a ruling few grew rich in serving foreign interests - the interests of the strong states. The Arab Spring was a reaction against this broken promise. And current uproar, all in the name of Islam, is in fact an internal struggle following regime collapse. Part of the old elite tries to reinvent itself, renew its promise. Islamist forces combat them by combatting their example, the Western liberal democracies. Does this make Political Islam a force of progress? I doubt it. Surely its current form is anti-Western, an enemy of the current installment of imperial privileges. The rise of Islamist regimes eats away at the hegemony of the West and brings the world further in touch with a growing multipolar reality. It will however not free the majority of the Muslim population, nor bring them material progress.

The American Voter: US Political Culture Explored

I worked really hard on this post and wondered if I would finish it by the US presidential elections of 2012. Luckily for me it is done well before. So here it is: some reflections on the American voter, backed with numbers and fancy sources. This post is not so much on ordeal, rather it functions as a set of ideas that frame the upcoming elections. Feel free to feel inspired and please share any thoughts! :p

Political culture is hard to define, yet it offers an attractive explanation for national differences concerning political behavior such as voting. 'The French are such', 'Americans do not think that way', etc. I am confident you have heard some like those before. There are indeed a lot of differences, but they are in my opinion not given. First of all political culture is dynamic: it can change over time (see the graph below). This is evident from the declining trust in political institutions with Americans. Second, the creation of and changes in political culture are the result of historical development. The trust is influenced by education levels, economic climate and central figures with their vigor or scandal.

Now how unique is the American political culture? Ronald Inglehart, famous amongst political scientists, was a driving force behind thinking about post-materialism: a value pattern focussing on self-realization relative to self-preservation. By adding traditionalism/secularism as a second dimension, Inglehart identified different cultures. He found an Anglo-Saxon value pattern which scores very high on self-realization and moderate on the second dimension. This is expressed in various features of American political culture: the perceived exceptionalism, the belief in popular judgement and the typical conception of freedom. All these elements are rooted in the history of the American state and society: fleeing religious or political persecution, resistance against the English crown, the autonomy of the states, etc.

(It needs to be said that the dominant political culture in the United States is perhaps more of an imposed value pattern rooted in the Anglo-Saxon and Protestant inheritance. Values differ along various lines, of which ethnicity might well be one. In how far the political culture is shared by say Afro-Americans or Latinos is hard to say. Even more difficult is it to draw conclusions as to how 'American' American political culture is.)

'American' political culture: a combination of influences or
the dominance of white Anglo-Saxon Protestant values?

The above should enable us to situate the American political culture and place it in its historical context. On to the voter now, as the upcoming election is the essence of this article. United States politics is largely spared from the increasing fragmentation that has Europe in its grip. Even in the UK they need to form coalitions now, despite the majoritarian mode of voting. This does however not mean that voting behavior didn't change in the States. Like everywhere in the West, identification of the voters with a single party has been diminishing. The electorate is increasingly motivated by what is called 'retrospective voting': casting your ballot based on specific issues, the image of parties/leaders and the economic climate.

Studies from the sixties up till now show that only up to a fifth of the American population is motivated by ideological reasons when casting the vote; about 40% defines politics in terms of group interests (classes, ethnicity, etc.) and 25% rewards or punishes the establishment based on the general tendency of the economy and society as a whole. The others are, sadly, apathetic: they don't give a ----. Furthermore, an overwhelming eight out of ten voters show no temporal stability in their ideological preferences. However in times of crisis and change the electorate becomes more ideological in its thought than its leaders, pushing for extremes. If these results don't seem to tell you anything, read this paragraph over once again whilst thinking about Obama's success in 2008. Now repeat that exercise with the possible Republican nominees for this year in mind.

Sources:

Converse, P.E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D.E. Apter (Ed.), Ideology and discontent (pp. 206-261). New York: Free Press.

Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2010). Elections and voters. In Comparative government and politics: An introduction (pp. 179-202). Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2010). Political culture. In Comparative government and politics: An introduction (pp. 121-137). Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic and social change in 43 countries. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1999). Postmodernization erodes respect for authority, but increases support for democracy. In P. Norris (Ed.), Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance (pp. 359-392). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Putnam, R. (2002). Democracies in flux: The evolution of social capital in contemporary society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sears, D.O. & Funk, C.L. (1990). The role of self-interest in social and political attitudes, Advances in experimental social psychology, 24, pp. 1-91.